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Abstract: While some philosophers suggest that mystical experience may 
provide evidence for belief in God, skeptics doubt that there is adequate 
warrant for even accepting the claim of a mystical experience as evidence for 
anything, except perhaps for some kind of mental instability. Drawing from 
the work of Gabriel Marcel, I argue that the pervasive philosophical 
skepticism about the evidential status of mystical experiences is misguided 
because it rests on too narrow a view about ways of knowing and about what 
can count as evidence for belief in the divine. I illustrate the advantages of 
Marcel’s approach by applying it to the respective spiritual journeys of 
Augustine of Hippo and Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali. I then argue that 
Marcel’s framework improves on contemporary analytic approaches because it 
captures more accurately the kind of knowledge that mystical experiences 
convey as reported by the subjects who claim to have them. 
 
In our Western academic philosophy . . . it is said that religion is a 
refuge for those who because of weakness of intellect or character are 
unable to confront the stern realities of the world. The objective, 
mature, strong attitude is to hold beliefs solely on the basis of 
evidence.” 
—Norman Malcolm, “The Groundlessness of Religious Belief”1 
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People who claim to have had mystical experiences often 
describe these experiences as noetic. To say that a mystical 
experience is noetic is to say that it conveys some kind of insight or 
knowledge. Monica Furlong notes that one common denominator 
shared by male and female mystics from across the centuries and 
across religious traditions is “the conviction that there is a reality, a 
profound meaning, behind the world of appearances. . . . They often 
give the name God to that reality.”2 Claims about the noetic character 
of mystical experiences do not fit easily into the dominant 
epistemological frameworks of contemporary analytic philosophy. 
While a small handful of philosophers have suggested that mystical 
experience may provide evidence for belief in God, at least for the 
subjects of those experiences, this suggestion is not taken very 
seriously in wider circles.3 Skeptics doubt that there is warrant even 
for accepting the claim of a mystical experience as evidence for 
anything, except perhaps for some kind of mental weakness or 
instability. 
 
Drawing from the work of Gabriel Marcel, a twentieth-century 
French existentialist, I argue that this pervasive skepticism about the 
evidential status of mystical experiences is misguided because it rests 
on too narrow a view about ways of knowing and about what can 
count as evidence for belief in the divine.4 Although Marcel does 
not develop an epistemology specific to the phenomenon of mystical 
experience, he does argue for two very different approaches to reality 
that correspond to two very different kinds of knowledge about reality. 
We can either approach reality as composed of an infinite number of 
problems to solve, or we can be open to the possibility that reality 
contains at least some mysteries in which we can participate and that 
we can embrace. According to Marcel, mysteries can be a source of 
wisdom. Indeed, they can communicate a deep and profound 
knowledge about the nature of reality and of human existence. I argue 
that we ought to use Marcel’s epistemology of mystery to understand 
the noetic quality of mystical experiences. 
 
In the first section of this paper, I discuss the difference 
between a problem and a mystery and explore how Marcel thinks we 
acquire knowledge of each of these, respectively. In the second 
section of the paper, I illustrate Marcel’s approach by applying it to 
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two particular examples of mystical experience. The spiritual journeys 
of both Augustine of Hippo and Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali 
culminate in mystical union with God. This experience takes the form 
of image-mysticism for Augustine and of fana, or annihilation, for Al-
Ghazali. I argue that even though the content of their respective 
mystical experiences differs, a similarity in their epistemic approach 
can be discerned: each makes a transition from approaching God as a 
problem to embracing God as a mystery. The lesson of their respective 
spiritual journeys is that the knowledge of God that both of them 
desire can only be conveyed through an encounter with God as 
mystery. Marcel’s epistemology of mystery illuminates why and how 
this is. In the final section of the paper, I defend my use of Marcel’s 
framework to account for the noetic character of mystical experience 
in general, and of these two figures in particular. 
 
Before proceeding, I want to provide a working definition of 
mystical experience and to make a few disclaimers about the scope of 
my remarks. I use the term “mystical experience” to refer to those 
experiences that have at least the following features or “marks,” as 
William James puts it: (1) experiences of direct, personal encounter, 
(2) experiences that have a noetic quality, i.e., that convey to the 
subject some kind of insight or truth, and (3) experiences that are 
ineffable, that cannot be accurately or wholly put into words, or 
expressed in propositions.5 While not all mystical experiences are 
religious, I mean in this paper to focus on a narrower class of 
experiences that are both religious and mystical. Moreover, I focus on 
a still narrower class of religious mystical experiences that come from 
the major monotheistic traditions of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. 
 
1. Marcel’s Epistemology of Mystery 
 
According to Gabriel Marcel, we can see in reality an indefinite 
number of problems to solve as well as many mysteries to embrace.6 
In this section, I discuss three features of what I call Marcel’s 
epistemology of mystery. First, I clarify the distinction between a 
problem and a mystery. Second, I explain the unique epistemic/moral 
posture that one must assume in order to be open to the possibility of 
mysteries and to acquire knowledge of a mystery. Third, I describe the 
type of rational thought that one must use in order to reflect properly 
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on the meaning of one’s encounters with mystery and to decipher 
these mysteries. 
 
There are at least three central features of a problem-oriented 
approach to reality. First, a problem-oriented approach involves the 
separation of the investigator from that which she investigates. When I 
am faced with a problem to solve, “I work on the data, but everything 
leads me to believe that I need not take into account the I who is at 
work—it is a factor which is presupposed and nothing more.”7 In 
approaching a problem, I force it to submit to the categories, 
questions, and frameworks that serve my research goal. A second 
feature of a problem is that it requires a solution and is eradicated 
when a solution is found. Once the problem is solved, I can move on to 
a different one. A third feature is that the solution to a problem takes 
on a general or universal nature and is, at least in principle, publicly 
verifiable. Where “we can get sufficient distance from our own 
subjective, emotional, biographical selves in order to pose an objective 
problem, we can in theory get an answer which will be verifiable by all 
observers who will go through the appropriate procedures of 
observation and testing.”8 
 
A mystery may appear as a problem at first, but reflection 
reveals that “in a genuine mystery the distinction between subject and 
object, between what is in me and what is before me, breaks down.”9 
As Marcel puts it, a mystery is a “problem which encroaches upon its 
data, invading them as it were and thereby transcending itself as a 
problem” (OM, 19). I cannot place myself wholly outside of a mystery 
in order to investigate it, for there is no objective standpoint from 
which I can observe it. There is no Archimedean point qua mystery. 
Marcel uses the way we approach the study of reality itself to clarify 
the distinction between problem and mystery. For example, when we 
ask questions about the nature of reality or being, as the 
metaphysician refers to it, we often begin by taking a problem-
oriented approach. We ask questions like “What is being?” and “Does 
being exist?” but our expectation is not what it is when we are 
investigating a problem. “Immediately an abyss opens under my feet: 
I who ask these questions about being, how can I be sure that I exist? 
(OM, 15–16). From a problem-oriented approach, the I (i.e., the 
subject who is working on the “problem” of being) should be able to 
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remain outside of the problem. Yet the more I reflect on the “problem” 
of being, the more I realize that there is nowhere outside of being for 
me to stand. I cannot separate myself from the object of my 
investigation, i.e., being, in order to analyze and study it. Being is 
presupposed by my ability even to formulate questions about it. This is 
what Marcel means when he says that the problem “encroaches upon 
its own data,” thereby “transcending itself as a simple problem” (OM, 
19). When I ask questions about being, I cannot help but be asking 
about my being and about my reality. This is to be in the presence of 
what Marcel calls the mystery of being, or the ontological mystery 
(OM, 16–18). 
 
While problems are met with universal or generalized solutions, 
mysteries do not admit of generalized solutions. We cannot secure a 
solution to a mystery that can then be directly communicated to 
others, and mysteries are not publicly verifiable. The only way to 
“verify” both that something is a mystery, and the insight that 
mysteries can convey is through direct personal encounter with 
mystery. With “regard to the knowledge of a mystery every person 
must begin anew. . . . There may be a witness in which one person 
calls out to another and testifies to the meaning he has found in an 
encounter” with mystery, but “there can be no direct transmission of 
the creative assurance which such relations generate” (Keen, Gabriel 
Marcel, p. 21). Subjective involvement and participation is essential for 
gaining knowledge of a mystery. 
 
Examples of mysteries include the meaning of life, freedom, 
fidelity, and God. For example, in asking about the meaning of life, I 
cannot help but be involved in the question and have a personal stake 
in the answers that I discover. To pose a question about the meaning 
of life as if it were a mere object to be analyzed is to act as if the 
answers had no bearing on my own life. Yet surely the pursuit of 
figuring out what makes human existence valuable and meaningful 
bears tremendously on my particular existence (OM, 30). Questions 
about the nature of reality or the meaning of life “can never be 
decided on the basis of verifiable evidence which I can get apart from 
my willing, feeling, and deciding self,” in the way that solutions to 
problems can be so decided (Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 20). 
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Marcel is not critical of the problem-oriented approach as such. 
Scientific and technological advancement are important for helping us 
cure illnesses, build bridges, fly airplanes, and so on. Rather, he 
objects to the rampant misuse of a problem-oriented approach, which 
he sees as increasingly characteristic of contemporary society (OM, 
13). Marcel’s concern is that “intellectual and moral confusion results” 
when a problem-solving approach to the world “becomes imperialistic 
and claims the right to judge all knowledge and truth by criteria 
appropriate only to the aspect of the objective” (Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 
p. 19). There are at least two mistakes associated with a monopoly by 
the problem-oriented approach to reality. The first is an 
epistemological mistake. A problem-oriented approach simply will not 
yield knowledge of mysteries. If it becomes the only or the dominant 
method of inquiry for all domains, we are denied the opportunity to 
know important truths that can only be conveyed through encounters 
with mystery. The second problem involves a moral mistake. The 
severe over-use of a problem-oriented approach to reality leads to 
what Marcel calls a functionalized world. In a functionalized world 
human beings tend to view themselves and others as reducible to their 
functions: I am a ticket collector, a doctor, a wife. Personal identity or 
who I am essentially becomes merely a matter of what I do (OM, 9–
12). The rampant misuse of a problem-oriented approach to reality 
encourages us to treat everything, including human beings, as objects 
or functions rather than as presences. 
 
Marcel’s notion of presence is an essential aspect of the 
epistemology of mystery and so requires some explication. Marcel 
thinks that in order to approach reality as containing at least some 
mysteries and to be open to the possibility that mysteries can be 
sources of wisdom, one must be able to assume an epistemic/moral 
posture of presence, which is quite different from the epistemic 
posture one assumes for problem solving (OM, 38). To approach 
another as a presence rather than an object is “to recognize him as a 
person, a unique free subject, someone whom I would not simply call 
‘he’ but would address more familiarly as ‘thou.’”10 In order to 
participate in mystery, the knower must be open to the possibility that 
some others may present themselves to her as presences rather than 
as objects, and she must in turn be capable of being present to others. 
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Marcel clarifies the notion of presence through the concepts of 
availability and unavailability. When someone is present to me, she is 
available to me in the sense that she is at my disposal when I am in 
need or desire to confide in her (OM, 39). By “available” Marcel does 
not mean that we should simply allow ourselves to be used by other 
people. Rather, availability “involves responding in complete freedom 
to a direct appeal” and “being receptive to an appeal addressed 
directly to me as a person, not as an object.”11 Being available has 
little to do with good intentions, or even with outward gesture or 
behavior. “The most attentive and conscientious listener may give me 
the impression of not being present; he gives me nothing, he cannot 
make room for me in himself, whatever the material favours which he 
is prepared to grant me” (OM, 40). For example, a highly competent 
doctor may listen to my needs and never fail to order the appropriate 
procedures or tests. Yet if I remain for her merely a diagnosis or a 
disease to treat rather than a person, she is not present to me no 
matter how capably she treats me. Presence is expressed in I-thou 
relationships as opposed to I-it relationships, and one distinctive 
feature of I-thou relationships is that they are reciprocal. “Presence 
involves a reciprocity which is excluded from any relation of subject to 
object or subject to subject-object” (ibid). Rather, presence expresses 
a relationship of subject to subject and an intimacy that, for a 
moment, blurs distinctions and boundaries between self and other. 
 
On the contrary, to be unavailable or incapable of presence is to 
be “in some manner not only occupied but encumbered with one’s own 
self” (OM, 42). At the heart of being unavailable is a deep self-
centeredness, a preoccupation with the self that makes it impossible to 
transcend the boundary between self and other. Marcel characterizes 
this self-centeredness that prevents one from being available or 
present as pride. Pride “consists in drawing one’s strength solely from 
one-self. The proud man is cut off from a certain form of communion 
with his fellow men” (OM, 32). Rather than approaching the other with 
openness, allowing the other to reveal herself, the proud person takes 
it upon herself to “create” the experience, to be in control of the 
experience, to make it happen. Pride involves an inward turn whereby 
a person tries to be totally self-reliant. 
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One can contrast a problem-oriented approach and a mystery-
oriented approach in terms of presence or lack thereof. When studying 
a problem, I need not be present or personally available to the object, 
the “it,” that I am investigating. Rather, I am self-reliant in creating 
and directing the investigation, in order to discover the facts of the 
matter through my own efforts and capacities. As an approach to 
mystery, this simply will not do. In order to acquire knowledge of 
mysteries, I must assume an epistemic posture of presence. I must 
adopt an attitude of unknowing, and I must be somewhat vulnerable 
to the other and patient, allowing space for the other to reveal herself 
to me. Moreover, I must allow that I might be changed, or acquire 
self-knowledge, in virtue of an encounter with mystery. 
 
One of the most profound experiences of presence according to 
Marcel is the experience of love. When I am in a genuinely loving 
relationship I see the other as a gift, not as inevitable or arbitrary, but 
as the result of an act of generosity.12 Love “does not experience the 
beloved as a separate object” and “it refuses to reduce the other to a 
collection of specifiable characteristics.”13 A loving relationship is not 
experienced as created by me but as presented to me; it is a mystery. 
I cannot understand or know love until I experience it, and when I do 
experience it, I am granted profound knowledge about the value and 
meaning of one important aspect of human existence. A pre-condition 
for experiencing any mystery, including love, is an epistemic/moral 
posture of presence whereby the ego must “break out of self-imposed 
imprisonment and enter into fully personal relationships.”14 
 
Even though knowledge of a mystery is experiential in the sense 
that it can only be acquired through individual, personal experience 
with mystery, and only by assuming an epistemic/moral posture of 
presence, Marcel argues that it is also the “essence of the mysterious 
to be approachable by a type of rational thought.”15 Reflection is 
required for coming to know both problems and mysteries, but there 
are two very different kinds of reflection that correspond to these two 
very different aspects of reality. Marcel refers to the kind of rational 
thought involved in knowing mysteries as secondary reflection. He 
distinguishes secondary reflection from primary reflection, which is the 
kind of rational thought involved in problem-solving. “While primary 
reflection seeks to gain clarity about the world of abstraction, 
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objectification, and verification, secondary reflection seeks a wider and 
richer understanding of the meaning of human existence by a return to 
the unity of experiences such as appreciation, fidelity, and faith within 
which the mystery of being is apprehended.”16 Whereas primary 
reflection seeks to dissolve the unity of experience in an act of 
analysis, secondary reflection seeks to recapture or reclaim the unity 
of experience; it is “recuperative.” 
 
In order to illustrate the difference between primary and 
secondary reflection, Keen considers the following example: When I 
ask about the significance of my faith in God, primary reflection 
 
searches for clarity by standing off from the experience, 
abstracting and looking for universal explanations for faith. . . . 
In all of this, however, an essential element of faith has been 
left out. It is my faith that is being investigated. Secondary 
reflection, therefore, will seek to recover the unity of experience 
by asking from within the experience of faith what meaning it 
has for me.17 
 
In secondary reflection I do not stand outside of my faith experiences 
to deconstruct and analyze them. Rather, through memory I gather 
together the important experiences of my life and view them in a 
unified way as my experiences. As I do so, I am also capable of 
recognizing that I am not identical to my life, but that I am able to 
take up a position with respect to my life without being entirely outside 
of or separate from the experiences that constitute my life. For Marcel, 
then, questions about whether or not it is rational to believe in God are 
mysteries, not problems. Marcel was ambivalent about the traditional 
proofs for God’s existence precisely because the proofs take a 
problem-oriented approach to God: they treat God as an object and 
aim to demonstrate the existence of this object.18 Even if this approach 
can yield some intellectual beliefs about God for some people, Marcel 
thought that the reason for the notorious inability for the proofs to 
persuade non-believers was that the proofs actually presuppose faith. 
That is, the proofs can only really confirm for believers what is already 
given to them in faith experience.19 In contrast to this, Marcel’s 
approach is phenomenological. In order to investigate questions about 
God, philosophers should start from concrete human experience. The 
divine is not experienced as an object or as a problem to solve, but 
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rather as a mystery. The existence of God is not to be asserted as the 
result of a syllogism, but the person of God is to encountered as a 
“thou.”20 For Marcel, however, this does not mean that God is 
unknowable. Mysteries are knowable, but only through personal, 
concrete experiences in which the knowing subject assumes an 
epistemic/moral posture of presence, and only by bringing secondary 
reflection (as opposed to primary reflection) to bear on those 
experiences. 
 
Philosophical skepticism regarding the evidential status of 
mystical experiences results, at least in part, from a monopoly by the 
problem-oriented approach within contemporary epistemology. 
Marcel’s epistemology of mystery offers an alternative, and in my view 
better, framework for philosophical understanding of the noetic 
character of mystical experiences. In the following section, I consider 
two particular examples that illustrate the value of Marcel’s approach. 
The spiritual journeys of both Al-Ghazali and Augustine of Hippo bear 
out the Marcelian lesson that a problem-oriented approach to God is 
misguided and remains insufficient for knowing God. Using Marcel’s 
epistemology of mystery as an interpretive framework, I trace the 
spiritual journeys of both Augustine and Al-Ghazali from skepticism, 
through intellectual certainty, to mystical union with God. 
 
2. The Spiritual Journeys of Al-Ghazali and 
Augustine 
 
Both Augustine’s Confessions21 and Al-Ghazali’s autobiographical 
essay, the “Deliverance from Error,”22 can be characterized in Marcel’s 
language as exercises in secondary reflection. Neither Augustine nor 
Al-Ghazali abstracts from the particularities of their experiences in 
order to produce generalizable solutions to the “problem” of mystical 
experience. Rather, through acts of remembering each of them 
recollects his experiences of the quest to know God, re-presents these 
experiences in the text as a unified journey, and is able to take up a 
position with respect to these experiences and to make judgments 
about them, all the while standing within the experience. Thus, both 
autobiographies begin where their respective spiritual journeys end, 
with the lessons that each has learned about how to come to a 
knowledge of God. Augustine states: “So too let him rejoice and 
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delight in finding you who are beyond discovery rather than fail to find 
you by supposing you to be discoverable” (I.10). Similarly, Al-Ghazali 
states: “Whoever thinks that the understanding of things Divine rests 
upon strict proofs has in his thought narrowed down the wideness of 
God’s mercy” (DE, 24). Putting it in Marcel’s language, both figures 
discover that God is not a problem to solve but a mystery to embrace. 
I begin with an account of Al-Ghazali’s story and then turn to 
Augustine. 
 
Al-Ghazali’s autobiography begins as a treatise directed to those 
who have asked him to testify about his journey through radical 
skepticism, an investigation of the four classes of seekers, and 
ultimately mysticism. He traces his journey from the “plain of naïve 
second-hand belief to the peak of direct vision” (DE, 17). As a youth, 
Al-Ghazali’s “thirst for the comprehension of things as they really are” 
drove him to question all of the beliefs that he had taken on mere 
authority. Inherited beliefs, he tells us, “ceased to hold me and . . . 
lost their grip on me” (DE, 19). He noticed that the children of 
Christians grew up Christian, the children of Jews grew up Jewish, and 
so on. Moreover, he drew from the tradition related from the Prophet 
that people are born with an original nature that is soun the 
implication that it is parents and other adults who disrupt this 
soundness by making children Jewish or Christian. These thoughts 
inspired a deep desire to know “what this original nature really was 
and what the beliefs derived from authority of parents and teachers 
really were, and also to make distinctions . . . between the true and 
the false in them” (ibid.). Al-Ghazali’s desire for knowledge becomes a 
quest for certainty about what he believes, and it requires more than a 
mere appeal to authority can provide. The goal was to achieve the kind 
of knowledge in which “the object is disclosed in such a fashion that no 
doubt remains along with it, that no possibility of error or illusion 
accompanies it, and that the mind cannot even entertain such a 
supposition” (DE, 19–20). 
 
Initially Al-Ghazali adopts a problem-oriented approach to 
knowledge of God. He begins by doubting all of those beliefs that it is 
possible to doubt, including beliefs he has acquired from sense 
perception and even beliefs about necessary truths. Yet, instead of 
leading him to a secure foundation for knowledge, all of this doubting 
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leads Al-Ghazali into a deep skepticism. He refers to his skepticism as 
an illness or malady in which he doubts even the possibility of 
knowledge. He is seriously disturbed by this state because he claims 
that the only remedy is demonstration, and yet demonstration involves 
combining first principles and necessary truths, and in his skeptical 
state he denies even these. After about two months, Al-Ghazali 
eventually “recovers” from this radical skepticism and decides that 
acquiring knowledge of God is possible. Yet his approach to knowledge 
of God is still noticeably framed by problem-solving. 
 
Al-Ghazali’s next strategy is to investigate the four classes of 
seekers. Each class claims to have knowledge of God, and so Al-
Ghazali decides it is worthwhile to explore both what they claim to 
know and how each class pursues knowledge of God. He considers 
respectively the paths of theology, philosophy, the Bat iniyah, and 
finally mysticism. Although Al-Ghazali finds theology important and 
useful for its rather narrowly defined task of defending the Sunnite 
creed and tradition from heretical attacks against the faith, he 
nonetheless discovers that theology is insufficient for rationally 
grounding belief in God. Theologians make explicit the contradictions 
of their opponents but base “their arguments on premises which they 
were compelled to admit by way of naïve belief, or the consensus of 
the community, or bare acceptance of the Quran and Traditions” (DE, 
28). Thus, the theologians cannot help the one who accepts nothing as 
certain but necessary truths; they cannot provide the kind of certain 
foundation for his beliefs that Al-Ghazali seeks. 
 
Al-Ghazali turns next to the philosophers and proves to be, on 
the whole, quite condemnatory of philosophy. Even though he thinks 
that philosophy is capable of leading to certain foundational and 
necessary truths about the natural world, he finds in all of the 
philosophers a mixture of both truth and falsehood, primarily because 
they all posit doctrines that contradict revealed knowledge. The 
philosophers are dangerous because, “mingled with their teaching, are 
maxims of the prophets and utterances of the mystics” and thus many 
people who read them conclude uncritically that the philosophers must 
speak the truth (DE, 43). Even though Al-Ghazali is not fond of 
philosophy, he is even less fond of the Bat iniyah. The Bat iniyah are 
the class of seekers who make claims to knowledge of the truth based 
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on instruction from infallible Imams. At length, Al-Ghazali condemns 
this group because they rely entirely on appeal to authority, an 
authority that they cannot even demonstrate to be worthy of such an 
appeal; they “have nothing to cure them or save them from the 
darkness of mere opinions” (DE, 54). His dissatisfaction with these 
three potential ways of seeking knowledge of God leads him lastly to 
the mystics. 
 
When Al-Ghazali begins his study of mysticism, he knows that it 
differs from the other three paths in that it includes both intellectual 
belief and practical activity, which aims at “getting rid of obstacles in 
the self . . . and vicious morals, so that the heart may attain to 
freedom from what is not God” (DE, 56). Al-Ghazali finds the 
intellectual belief much easier to grasp and indicates that at this point 
he remains more comfortable with taking a problem-oriented approach 
to God. After reading all of the books of the mystics, he comprehends 
“their fundamental teachings on the intellectual side” and progresses 
“as far as possible by study and oral instruction, in the knowledge of 
mysticism” (ibid.). Indeed at this point, Al-Ghazali claims to achieve 
the intellectual certainty that he craves regarding the three essential 
creedal principles of faith in God, in prophethood, and in the Last Day. 
 
Yet the certainty that he eventually secures through a problem-
oriented approach to God remains deeply unsatisfying, and does not 
move Al-Ghazali to act and to live the kind of spiritual life that he 
desires to live. He soon realizes that the mystics seem to possess 
knowledge of God that “cannot be apprehended by study, but only by 
immediate experience . . . and moral change” (DE, 57). In Marcel’s 
language, Al-Ghazali finally realizes that there is a kind of knowledge 
about the divine that cannot be attained through problem-solving, but 
only through an experiential encounter with the divine nature. Al-
Ghazali draws an analogy to health: “What a difference there is 
between knowing the definition of health . . . and being healthy” 
(ibid.). Al-Ghazali realizes that there is a difference between knowing 
definitions of God and creeds, and knowing God. God is a presence 
rather than a problem, a “thou” to enter into relationship with rather 
than an “it” to investigate. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 50, No. 2 (June 2010): pg. 221-241. Permalink. This article is © Philosophy 
Documentation Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 
Philosophy Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
14 
 
Moreover, he discerns that the knowledge of God that the 
mystics possess requires moral change on the part of the seeker. He 
must “sever the attachments of the heart to worldly things,” and this 
can only happen by “turning away from wealth and position and 
fleeing from all time-consuming entanglements” (DE, 58). To use 
Marcel’s language, Al-Ghazali discovers that the kind of knowledge 
that the mystics possess requires an epistemic/moral posture of 
presence. He must become present, or spiritually available, to God by 
“getting rid of obstacles in the self . . . and vicious morals, so that the 
heart may attain to freedom from what is not God” (DE, 56). And yet 
he remains unable to do so. He states: 
 
I considered the circumstances of my life, and realized that I 
was caught in a veritable thicket of attachments. . . . One day I 
would form the resolution to quit Baghdad and get rid of these 
adverse circumstances; the next day I would abandon my 
resolution. I put one foot forward and drew the other back. . . . 
Worldly desires were striving to keep me by their chains just 
where I was, while the voice of faith was alling, “‘To the road! to 
the road!” (DE, 59)  
For six months Al-Ghazali “tossed” about in this state, unable to 
become spiritually available to God until eventually he has what one 
might describe as a severe mental and physical breakdown, for which 
“the only method of treatment is that the anxiety which has come over 
the heart should be allayed” (DE, 60). 
 
Al-Ghazali’s initial inability to assume an epistemic/moral 
posture of presence can be attributed, in Marcel’s language, to pride. 
Al-Ghazali struggles to become present to God because he continues 
to rely on himself to “create” a relationship with God and to have the 
strength to turn away from the world; he remains encumbered with 
himself and thus unavailable to God. It is not until Al-Ghazali realizes 
that, left to his own devices, he simply cannot overcome this malady 
and lead the life that he wishes to live until he finally begins to become 
present to God. He states: “I sought refuge with God most high as one 
driven to Him, because he is without further resources of his own” 
(ibid.). In this moment of surrender, he begins to overcome his pride 
by taking refuge in God and by being open to the possibility of 
encounter with divine presence. The encounter occurs and is life-
changing. As Al-Ghazali states: “He made it easy for my heart to turn 
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away from position and wealth, from children and friends” (ibid.). Al-
Ghazali spends ten years in solitude, during which time he claims that 
“there were revealed to me things innumerable and unfathomable” 
(DE, 63). In attempting to describe the kind of knowledge conveyed in 
his mystical encounters, he remarks: “it is hard to describe in 
language; if a man attempts to express these, his words inevitably 
contain what is clearly erroneous. In general, what [mystics] manage 
to achieve is nearness to God” (DE, 64). 
 
The spiritual journey that Augustine of Hippo recounts in his 
Confessions is strikingly similar to Al-Ghazali’s spiritual quest. 
Augustine’s search for knowledge of God is also a pursuit of certainty 
in regard to what he believes. Augustine initially assumes a problem-
oriented approach to God that leads him first into a deep skepticism, 
but eventually he comes to the secure foundation for his beliefs that 
he craves. Like Al-Ghazali, Augustine discovers that what knowledge of 
God he achieves through a problem-oriented approach remains deeply 
unsatisfying because God is not an object to investigate but a subject 
to love—a mystery. 
 
As a youth, Augustine did well in school. Although he did not 
always enjoy his studies, he did always “delight in the truth,” even in 
the smallest of matters (I.31). While in Carthage, this initial love of 
wisdom deepens and matures when Augustine is introduced to Cicero’s 
Hortensius and Aristotle’s Categories. He claims that Cicero taught him 
to love wisdom itself, wherever it might be found, rather than to 
adhere dogmatically to particular scholars or schools of thought 
(III.8). Augustine is so influenced by Aristotle that he tries to conceive 
of everything that exists, including God, under the ten categories 
(IV.29). Here it is quite clear that he assumes a problem-oriented 
method of inquiry concerning questions about God. Augustine 
approaches God as an object, an “it” to investigate through the 
categories of philosophical analysis. 
 
At Carthage Augustine becomes deeply influenced by the 
Manichees, an affiliation he continues as he journeyed to Rome and 
Milan. While in Rome, one “problem” that Augustine struggles with is a 
version of the problem of evil. He wrestles with how the existence of a 
single, infinitely good God might be made compatible with the 
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existence of evil in the world. The Manichees offer a plausible solution 
to this problem by holding that reality is fundamentally composed of 
two substances, one infinitely good, the other infinitely evil, which 
resolves the difficulty of attributing evil to one omnibenevolent creator 
(V.20.). Augustine is not only won over by Manichee arguments about 
the nature of the divine but also persuaded by the Manichees that 
Catholic doctrines are false and that Catholic scriptures full of 
contradictions and absurdities. 
 
Augustine travels from Rome to Milan where he becomes 
acquainted with Ambrose, who delivers what Augustine takes to be 
tremendously compelling arguments against the Manichees. Ambrose 
persuades Augustine that their arguments are unsound by interpreting 
scripture in a way that resolves the apparent contradictions. Yet 
Ambrose remains unable to provide the kind of certainty about 
Catholic teachings that Augustine seeks. Augustine states: “I wanted 
to be as certain about things I could not see as I am certain that seven 
and three are ten. . . . I desired other things to be as certain as this 
truth, whether physical objects or spiritual matters” (VI.6). Ambrose’s 
arguments cannot provide this kind of certainty. 
 
Consequently, though Augustine begins to question Manichee 
doctrines, he remains unconvinced that he should accept Catholicism. 
He states: 
 
Granted it could have educated people who asserted its claims 
and refuted objections with abundant argument and without 
absurdity. But it was not sufficient ground to condemn what I 
was holding. There could be an equally valid defence for both. 
So, to me the Catholic faith appeared not to have been defeated 
but also not yet to be the conqueror. (V.25) 
 
This lack of certainty about any doctrine launches Augustine into a 
deep skepticism about the possibility of gaining knowledge of God at 
all. Augustine believes that God exists and cares for his creatures. Yet 
he wants to understand the nature of God’s substance and to achieve 
certainty in what he believes. His quest for this certain knowledge of 
God, framed by a problem-solving approach, has led instead to radical 
skepticism (VI.8.). He states: “Accordingly, after the manner of the 
Academics . . . I doubted (V.25). 
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After his encounter with Ambrose and his decision to suspend all 
judgment, the first major turning point in Augustine’s spiritual journey 
occurs through acquaintance with Platonic philosophy. Augustine 
credits the Platonists with leading him even further down the “path 
toward God” by teaching him to seek for wisdom in immaterial truth 
rather than in the changing contingencies of this world: “after reading 
the books of the Platonists and learning from them to seek for 
immaterial truth I turned my attention to your ‘invisible nature 
understood through the things which are made’” (VII.26). Indeed, 
Augustine claims that his study of the Platonists eventually led him to 
achieve the kind of intellectual certainty needed to ground his belief 
and to live a life of faith: “I was certain that you are infinite. . . . I was 
sure that you truly are, and are always the same; that you never 
become other or different in any part or by any movement of position” 
(VII.26). Yet, despite the intellectual certainty he achieves at this 
point, he remains unmoved: “of these conceptions [of God] I was 
certain but to enjoy you I was too weak” (ibid.). And again at the 
beginning of Book VIII, “all doubt had been taken from me. . . . My 
desire was not to be more certain of you but more stable in you” 
(VIII.1). His intellectual doubts are completely quelled, and yet a 
change of heart does not come. It is at this point that Augustine’s 
language betrays his frustration most forcefully. He discusses the 
absurdity he feels at having intellectual certainty about God and 
yet remaining completely unmoved to live a life of faith in God 
(VIII.1). Being now absolutely certain of the truths of Christianity, his 
mind commands itself to believe and to make a total conversion, and 
yet the mind that commands itself does not obey its own command. 
He exclaims: “What causes this monstrosity, and why does this 
happen?” (VIII.21). “I no longer had my usual excuse to explain why I 
did not yet despise the world and serve you, namely, that my 
perception of the truth was uncertain. But now I was indeed quite sure 
about it” (VIII.11). What Augustine realizes at this point is that 
intellectual knowledge of God is insufficient for conversion. He finally 
discerns “the way which leads to the home of bliss, not merely as an 
end to be perceived but as a realm to live in” (VI.26, emphasis mine). 
Using Marcel’s language, we could say that Augustine finally realizes 
that God is not a problem to solve or object to investigate (“an end to 
be perceived”) but a mystery to embrace (“a realm to live in”). The 
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knowledge of God that he seeks can only be had in an encounter with 
the divine, which requires moral change. In Marcel’s terms, Augustine 
realizes that he must assume an epistemic/moral posture of presence 
and become available to God. Yet, left to his own devices, he remains 
unable to engender the moral change required. 
 
Augustine’s frustration peaks when he hears Ponticianus tell a 
story about uneducated men who have followed the example of 
Anthony and are ardent believers on fire with love for God. These 
uneducated men have achieved what Augustine, with all of his 
education and study, cannot achieve and this realization causes 
Augustine to cry out in anguish. Augustine turns to his dear friend 
Alypius and exclaims: “What is wrong with us? . . . Uneducated people 
are rising up and capturing heaven . . . and we with our high culture 
without any heart—see where we roll in the mud of flesh and blood” 
(VIII.19). Augustine’s prolonged inability to assume an  pistemic/moral 
posture of presence required for genuine conversion can be attributed, 
in Marcel’s language, to pride. Augustine remains encumbered with 
himself and continues to rely on himself to “create” the experience of 
God. 
 
In this midst of this monstrosity, Augustine has a vision of Lady 
Continence, who gently tells him that if he will only stop relying on 
himself and “make the leap without anxiety, he [the Lord] will catch 
you and heal you” (VIII.27). The vision reveals multitudes of people 
who have “made the leap,” and Lady Continence gently admonishes 
Augustine: “Are you incapable of doing what these men and women 
have done? . . . Why are you relying on yourself, only to find yourself 
unreliable” (VIII.27, emphasis mine). In Marcel’s terms, this vision 
invokes Augustine to stop being so proud and to stop relying wholly 
upon himself to “create” the conversion experience, but instead to 
allow God to respond with love. Once Augustine overcomes his pride 
and becomes open to the mystery of God, his monstrosity is 
overcome. At this point, Augustine literally breaks down in sorrow. He 
throws himself under a fig tree and lets his tears flow freely (VIII.28). 
As he sobs, he hears a voice prompting him to pick up the scriptures 
and read. He opens to a passage from Romans, and upon reading the 
“first passage on which [his] eyes lit,” he states: “At once, with the 
last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from all anxiety 
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flooded into my heart” (VIII.30). Shortly after this experience, 
Augustine returns to Ostia to visit his mother. While in Ostia, 
Augustine and his mother have a mystical encounter in which their 
“minds were lifted up by an ardent affection towards eternal being 
itself . . . to attain to the region of inexhaustible abundance” (IX.24). 
He describes it as a direct encounter with wisdom, which he was able 
to touch “in some small degree by a moment of total concentration of 
the heart” (IX.29). 
 
The mystical encounters of both Al-Ghazali and Augustine are 
ultimately experiences of love in which even the duality of an I-thou 
relationship is overcome as the self merges in union with God. For 
Augustine, union with God is expressed in image mysticism in which a 
trace, or image, of the trinitarian God is “seen” in the trinitarian soul of 
the human being.23 For Al-Ghazali, union with God is expressed in fana 
or annihilation in which the self literally becomes absorbed into God.24 
Although the content of their mystical experiences differs, we may use 
Marcel’s epistemology of mystery as an interpretive framework to 
reveal that the epistemic/moral approach leading to these experiences 
is the same: Augustine and Al-Ghazali both make a transition from 
approaching God as a problem for resolution to embracing God as a 
mystery, and in so doing each finally comes to know God. I do not 
mean to suggest that approaching God as a mystery caused their 
respective mystical encounters. Rather, their prolonged inability to 
know God by approaching God as a problem to solve reveals the 
inadequacies of a problem-oriented framework. Their respective 
spiritual journeys affirm that God is a mystery, not a problem, and 
that an epistemic/moral posture of presence is required in order for 
one to acquire the wisdom available in a mystical encounter. The lives 
of these two figures illustrate the usefulness of Marcel’s epistemology 
of mystery for a philosophical understanding of the noetic quality of 
mystical experience. However, a rigorous defense of Marcel’s approach 
requires more than merely illustrating his framework through the lives 
of two believers. In the following section, I defend the radical import of 
Marcel’s epistemology of mystery for explaining the noetic quality of 
mystical experiences in general, and of these two figures in particular. 
 
3. A Defense of Marcel’s Epistemology of Mystical 
Experience 
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There is a pervasive skepticism within analytic epistemology 
regarding the noetic quality of mystical experiences. One notable 
exception to this tendency is to be found in the work of William Alston. 
Remaining squarely within the frameworks of contemporary analytic 
epistemology, Alston defends the evidential status of mystical 
experience for grounding certain beliefs about God.25 Alston argues 
that subjects who have mystical experiences are, on the basis of those 
experiences, rationally justified in believing certain propositions about 
God. His strategy is to demonstrate that Christian epistemic practice is 
prima facie no less reliable than ordinary perceptual practice. Using 
sense experience as the standard, he investigates the extent to which 
the belief-forming practices of mystics measure up to this standard. 
Alston concludes that, by and large, belief-forming practices on the 
basis of mystical experience are epistemically comparable to belief-
forming practices on the basis of ordinary sense perception. Insofar as 
beliefs based on sense experience are rational, then in the absences of 
significant defeaters, belief in God on the basis of mystical experiences 
is also rational. One virtue of Alston’s approach is that he assume the 
terms of the philosophical skeptic (at least those willing to take sense 
experience as a paradigm of empirical knowledge) and attempts to 
show how, using those terms, one can defend and explain the noetic 
quality of mystical experiences. If this approach is successful, then 
why posit the need for an alternative epistemology of mysticism that 
relies on Marcel’s work? Alston offers a more moderate approach by 
granting the skeptic’s relatively uncontroversial philosophical starting 
points; Marcel does not, and instead presents a fairly radical shift to a 
new epistemological framework. So why isn’t Alston’s strategy more 
promising than Marcel’s approach, especially for persuading the non-
believer or the skeptic? 
 
Alston is operating within an empiricist framework that takes 
propositional knowledge derived from sense experience as 
paradigmatic. On his approach, questions about the noetic quality of 
mystical experiences become questions about the extent to which a 
subject is warranted in believing certain propositions about God on the 
basis of these experiences. Indeed, Alston explicitly characterizes the 
epistemic value of mystical experiences in terms of conveying 
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important information about God. In the introduction to Perceiving 
God, Alston states: 
 
At the outset I should make it explicit that though I will be 
concerned with the epistemic value of the perception of God, I 
by no means suppose that to be its only, or even its most 
important, value. From a religious point of view. . . . The chief 
value of the experience of God is that it enables us to enter into 
personal relationships with God. . . . But my topic in this book 
will be the function of the experience of God in providing 
information about God and our relations to Him.26 
 
What I want to emphasize here is how Alston distinguishes the 
epistemic value of these experiences from their personal value. Alston 
assumes that the epistemic value of mystical experiences, while 
obviously related to their personal value, can be separated out for the 
purposes of analysis. For Alston, the epistemic value is the 
propositions that one can garner from these experiences—information 
about God—and his task is to show that one is justified in believing 
certain propositions on the basis of these experiences. The personal 
and religious aspects of mystical experiences, while important, are 
distinct from the noetic aspects of these experiences, or if related to 
the noetic aspects, they can and should be distinguished for the sake 
of analysis. 
 
By remaining firmly within the framework of traditional 
empiricism, Alston treats mystical experiences as problems that 
require a solution; he submits mystical experiences to the categories 
of analysis that this tradition allows. While this strategy is a virtue of 
his account in one respect, it is a significant weakness of Alston’s 
approach in another respect, and in my view this latter aspect is more 
important. The problem is that Alston’s approach does not capture 
accurately the noetic quality of mystical experiences as reported by 
the subjects who have them. The epistemic value of mystical 
experiences is not that the subject comes to know about God, but 
rather that the subject comes to know God. That is, the noetic quality 
of mystical experiences cannot be separated from the personal, 
relational aspects of these experiences: the epistemic value is in the 
personal encounter, and the ability after the encounter to claim “I 
know God,” and not just that “I know things about God.” It may be 
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true that subjects come to affirm certain propositions about God on 
the basis of mystical experiences. Yet the epistemic value of these 
experiences is not reducible to (nor even primarily involving) the 
acquisition of information about God. This is precisely what the 
spiritual journeys of Augustine and Al-Ghazali reveal: the epistemic 
value of their respective mystical experiences does not consist in 
gaining more propositional knowledge about God, or even greater 
certainty or justification for the propositions they already believed 
about God. Indeed, their pursuit of propositional knowledge frustrated 
their ability to know God. The epistemic value of their respective 
mystical experiences was in coming to know God as a subject in an 
encounter that altered dramatically the course of life for both of these 
figures. Alston’s approach is limited because he remains within a 
problem-oriented framework, and as such his analysis fails to capture 
accurately the kind of knowledge that is conveyed in these 
experiences. The lesson from the spiritual journeys of Augustine and 
Al-Ghazali is that we need alternatives to “problem-oriented 
epistemologies” in order to explain the noetic character of mystical 
experiences because a fundamentally different kind of knowledge is 
conveyed in these experiences than propositional knowledge of God. 
Marcel’s epistemology is just such an alternative, and it can explain 
the noetic quality of mystical experiences in the terms of the subjects 
who claim to have them rather than in the terms of the philosophical 
skeptics who doubt them. 
 
However, trading in Alston’s analytic approach for Marcel’s 
phenomenological framework may generate a second possible 
objection. One might worry that my application of Marcel’s 
epistemology of mystery to mystical experiences misappropriates his 
framework. In order to see why, it is important to understand the 
context within which Marcel discusses questions about the rationality 
of belief in God. Marcel contends that it is within the scope of 
philosophy to affirm rational belief in God, but that the strategy of the 
traditional proofs is misguided. The proofs are ineffective because they 
presuppose belief and because they rely on a kind of category mistake 
by treating God as a problem that requires a solution. However, 
mystical experiences are also not ideal starting points for a 
philosophical discussion of the rationality of belief in God, as opposed 
to a theological discussion, because these experiences are private, 
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non-discursive, not universally experienced, and typically colored by 
the particular creedal or faith-commitments of the subject. As Tom 
Anderson notes, Marcel’s distinctive strategy is to ground the 
rationality of religious belief in “nothing less than non-mystical 
encounters with God,” which nonetheless involve a revelation of divine 
presence.27 In short, Marcel’s epistemology of mystery is offered as an 
alternative both to the traditional proofs and to mystical experiences 
as ways of rationally grounding belief in God. 
 
Marcel’s approach is phenomenological, and so he seeks to 
ground belief in God in experiential encounters with divine presence. 
Yet he aims to find common, universally available experiential ground 
that even the non-theist could accept as a philosophical starting-point. 
In this respect, then, Marcel’s approach does not seem so unlike 
Alston’s strategy. The difference between the two is that Alston relies 
on sense-experience and remains within a problem-oriented 
framework. Marcel shifts the terms of the discussion by relying on a 
fundamentally different kind of experience, the experience of mystery. 
Yet mysteries, and the divine presence revealed in them, are not 
reserved for the mystic or even just for the theist, but are central 
aspects of ordinary human existence. 
 
Thus, Marcel’s own philosophical discussion of how one might 
come to affirm the existence of God through mysteries does not 
emphasize mystical experiences where those are understood as direct 
encounters with God. Instead, Marcel emphasizes that mysteries are 
essential aspects of human life and are experiences with other human 
beings through which God’s presence can be revealed. For Marcel, the 
possibility of affirming God’s existence is open to believer and non-
believer alike because certain fundamentally human experiences, e.g., 
love, fidelity, and promise-making, presuppose the existence of the 
divine, the “Absolute Thou.” God is encountered in these experiences 
through ordinary human interactions, for “we are aware of God’s 
presence in and through the experience of that which is not God. . . . 
The encounter with or experience of God, then, is mediated through 
the experience of creatures. It is not an immediate ineffable 
experience involving depth of insight into the ultimate nature of Being 
as in mysticism.”28 
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Moreover, Marcel distinguishes clearly between philosophy and 
religion on the basis of the kinds of mysteries that are within their 
scope. Religion “deals with mysteries, such as the Incarnation, 
available only through revelation ‘which no effort of thought bearing 
on experience can enable us to attain.’ Philosophy, however, deals 
with mysteries ‘which are enveloped in human experience as such,’ 
and are therefore, accessible to philosophical reflection.”29 Thus, for 
Marcel, the “presence of God, which the philosophers should recognize 
and become witness of, is ‘enveloped’ in more mundane human 
experiences” and does not involve particular creeds or religious 
beliefs.30 In being concerned with mysteries that are “enveloped in 
ordinary human experience,” it may seem that philosophy is not 
particularly well-suited to investigate mystical experiences. So, on the 
one hand, Marcel’s approach is preferable to Alston’s strategy because 
the epistemology of mystery more adequately captures the kind of 
knowledge that is conveyed in mystical experiences. On the other 
hand, Marcel neither derives nor applies his framework to mystical 
experiences, and indeed seems to offer the epistemology of mystery 
as an alternative to mysticism for rationally grounding belief in God, at 
least from a philosophical perspective. 
 
There are at least three points that support my use of Marcel’s 
epistemology of mystery to explain the noetic quality of mystical 
experience from a philosophical perspective. First, while mystical 
experiences are certainly not ordinary or common, they are 
nonetheless experiences that human beings have. Unlike mysteries of 
religious faith, such as the Incarnation, which “no effort of thought 
bearing on experience can enable us to attain,” mystical experiences 
do have a basis in human experience. Moreover, the difference 
between the mediated revelation of divine presence through mysteries 
of ordinary human life, and the immediate revelation of divine 
presence through mystical experiences, is a difference in degree rather 
than kind. The revelation of divine presence in experiences of human 
relationships of love or fidelity is but a vague, unspecified, and 
incomplete glimpse of the clear, definite, certain experience of divine 
presence revealed in mystical encounters. Both are of divine presence 
or Absolute Thou; the difference is in how, and the degree to which, 
divine presence is encountered. Marcel’s own distinction between what 
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we might call philosophical faith and religious faith underscores this 
point. 
 
Marcel distinguishes between “faith affirmations of God’s reality 
which is philosophical in nature, which he calls ‘faith in general’ and . . 
. a ‘concrete’ faith involving particular creeds, religious beliefs, or 
ecclesiastical contexts.”31 Philosophical faith involves no particular 
religious creeds or belief; it is “faith in general” and is available to 
anyone who opens herself to the possibility of mystery and assumes 
the kind of epistemic/moral posture required to experience the 
mysterious in ordinary human life. In contrast, religious faith is 
concrete and informed by particular creeds or beliefs, and often by 
revealed truths that are not accessible through reflection on human 
experience. However, for Marcel philosophical or “general faith” and 
religious or “concrete faith” are both “the result of, and hence only 
possible because of, revelation” of divine presence.32 A person does 
not have to have “concrete faith” in order to have access to divine 
presence. Thus, on Marcel’s account, the divine presence experienced 
in mystical encounters, while certainly different in degree, and 
different in the details, is not fundamentally different in kind from the 
divine presence revealed in more ordinary human experiences of 
mystery. 
 
The third point is that the epistemic/moral posture of presence 
and availability that makes one open to the possibility of mysteries in 
ordinary human life is the same posture that makes one open to the 
possibility of mystical experiences. It is true that mystical encounters 
are sometimes reported to happen to a subject who may be previously 
unavailable or closed to such possibilities. One might think here of St. 
Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus. Yet for someone to 
embrace the mystery revealed in a mystical encounter, rather than 
being dismissive of or skeptical about it, requires that one assume an 
epistemic/moral posture of presence and availability to the mysterious. 
The subject of a mystical experience must still decide how to interpret 
the experience and whether to accept it as a genuine experience or to 
write it off as delusion. She must decide how to integrate the 
experience with all the other experiences and encounters of her life.33 
So, even though mystical experiences may be immediate and may 
overwhelm a subject in the moment, in order for one to understand or 
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accept that experience as revelation of divine presence requires an 
epistemic/moral posture of presence that makes her at least open to 
the possibility that reality contains mysteries. The upshot of all three 
points is that the central features of ordinary mysteries are analogous 
in important respects to the central features of extra-ordinary mystical 
encounters of the divine, and thus, in my view, can be understood 
philosophically through the same framework: the epistemology of 
mystery. 
 
One other possible line of objection to my use of Marcel’s 
framework to account for the noetic quality of mystical experience 
involves a long-standing debate over whether and to what extent we 
can claim that mystical experiences are similar enough to consider 
under a single category.34 My argument that we apply Marcel’s 
epistemology of mystery to explain even a narrow class of mystical 
experiences across the three monotheistic traditions assumes that 
mystical experiences are in some sense comparable. In order for there 
to be an epistemology of mysticism, we must be able to characterize 
mystical experiences as more or less the same kinds of experiences. 
Whereas the previous objection was over whether or not ordinary 
mysteries and mystical experiences are comparable, this objection 
concerns whether mystical experiences across traditions are 
comparable. 
 
Steven Katz has issued a forceful argument against this 
possibility.35 Katz argues that mystical experiences across traditions—
and perhaps even within them—are incommensurable, and that the 
belief that mystical experiences can be accurately captured under a 
single category is false. The force of Katz’s position can be felt when 
one considers that the particular details of mystical experiences across 
traditions are, at best, radically diverse and, at worst, contradictory. 
Even the two mystics whom I compare in this paper have seemingly 
incompatible experiences of the divine: Augustine experiences a 
Trinitarian God, whereas Al-Ghazali experiences annihilation as the self 
being literally absorbed into God. Given such differences in the content 
of mystical experiences across traditions, in what sense is an 
epistemology of mysticism a legitimate project? 
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One easy, and perhaps too easy, response is that this objection, 
taken too far, falls back into treating mystical experiences as problems 
that require a solution. Worries about whether or not mystical 
experiences can be rigorously compared, assumes an approach 
whereby inquirers stand outside of these experiences and analyze 
them by breaking them into component parts in order to find some 
kind of generalizable, universal content. We treat these personal 
experiences of others like data by forcing them to submit to the 
categories of our disciplines to see how well they fit. Yet if mystical 
experiences are mysteries, then a problem-oriented approach will not 
yield knowledge of them, and it will not do to raise objections from 
within a problem-oriented framework. However, I think a more 
substantial response is in order and can be offered. 
 
It is true that the content of particular mystical encounters are 
typically colored by the subject’s background beliefs and context. 
Christians, for instance, often claim to have Christian mystical 
experience, Muslims have mystical experiences colored by Islam, and 
so on. Yet, this is not unlike encounters with mysteries in ordinary 
human life. For example, no two experiences of love are alike in their 
particular details. Moreover, the experiences of love by people from 
diverse religious and cultural contexts will be colored by the 
background beliefs that shape their particular tradition. In one sense, 
then, experiences of mysteries in ordinary human life are not 
comparable. Each person must begin anew, for mysteries cannot be 
communicated through demonstration but can only be known through 
concrete, personal experience. Yet the essence of mysteries, and the 
revelation of divine presence that can be encountered in mysteries, is 
in some sense the same. The similarities discerned from the testimony 
of those who encounter mysteries in ordinary human experiences is 
not offered as irrefutable proof either of the existence of the divine or 
that the divine has certain properties. Rather, such testimony is 
offered as a “witness, in which one person calls out to another and 
testifies to the meaning he has found in an encounter.”36 So too in the 
case of mystical experiences: mystical experiences often take the 
shape of particular religious creeds or traditions. An epistemology of 
mystery applied to mystical experience is not meant justify a particular 
view of God. Nonetheless, testimony from those who have these 
experiences reveals some similarities in experience. One important 
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similarity in testimony about mystical experiences across traditions is 
“the conviction that there is a reality, a profound meaning, behind the 
world of appearances.”37 That is, one similarity in experience is that 
mystical encounters are noetic. Marcel’s epistemology of mystery 
provides a framework for understanding the kind of knowledge 
conveyed in these experiences, and the epistemic/moral posture one 




Even though Marcel does not develop an epistemology specific 
to mysticism, his epistemology of mystery provides a radical new 
framework for understanding the noetic quality of mystical experiences 
as reported by the subjects who claim to have them. Marcel’s 
framework improves on contemporary analytic approaches because it 
captures more accurately the kind of knowledge that mystical 
experiences convey. Moreover, applying his epistemology of mystery 
to mystical experience is perfectly consistent with Marcel’s own 
philosophical discussions of the rationality of belief in God. Most 
importantly, however, revitalizing Marcel’s epistemology of mystery 
and extending it in new directions helps resist the monopoly of a 
problem-oriented approach to all domains of inquiry. Marcel’s 
epistemology of mystery is valuable because it broadens our 
understanding of the kinds of knowledge that are possible, and that 




1I wish to thank Frederick Denny, Tom Anderson, Franco V. Trivigno, 
and anonymous reviewers at IPQ for very helpful comments on 
this paper. See Norman Malcolm, “The Groundlessness of 
Religious Belief” in Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and 
Anthology, ed. Brian Davies (New York NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2000), p. 184. Here Malcolm is stating, though not agreeing 
with, the commonly held view that religious belief is irrational 
because there is no good evidence for it. 
2Monica Furlong, ed., Visions and Longings: Medieval Women Mystics 
(Boston MA: Shambala, 1996), p. 1. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 50, No. 2 (June 2010): pg. 221-241. Permalink. This article is © Philosophy 
Documentation Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 
Philosophy Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
29 
 
3See for example, C. D. Broad, “Arguments for the Existence of God, 
II,” The Journal of Theological Studies XL (1939): 156–67; 
Carolyn Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious 
Experience (Oxford UK: Clarendon Press, 1989); William Rowe, 
“Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity,” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13 (1982): 85–
92; Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science (London UK: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1935); Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 
revised edition (Oxford UK: Clarendon Press, 1991) and Is There 
a God? (Oxford UK: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996). 
4See, for example, Clyde Pax, An Existential Approach to God: A Study 
of Gabriel Marcel (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1972). 
5William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), p. 302. See also “Mysticism” in 
Exploring the Philosophy of Religion, ed. David Stewart (Upper 
Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998). 
6Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being (Chicago IL: Harvill Press Ltd., 
1960), vol. 1, p. 260, hereafter MB. 
7Gabriel Marcel, “The Ontological Mystery,” trans. Manya Harari, in The 
Philosophy of Existentialism (New York NY: Carol Publ. Group, 
1956), p. 17, hereafter OM. 
8Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel (Richmond VA: John Knox Press, 1967), p. 
18. 
9Ibid., p. 20. 
10Thomas Anderson, “Gabriel Marcel’s Notion of Being” in Contributions 
of Gabriel Marcel to Philosophy: A Collection of Essays (Lewiston 
NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), p. 68. 
11Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Marcel’s Concept of Availability” in The 
Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis 
Edwin Hahn (LaSalle IL: Open Court Press, 1984), p. 183. 
12Anderson, p. 68. 
13Ibid., p. 69. 
14Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 33. 
15Ibid., p. 22. 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
18Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. K. Farrer (New York NY: 
Harper, 1965), p. 121, hereafter BH. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 50, No. 2 (June 2010): pg. 221-241. Permalink. This article is © Philosophy 
Documentation Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 
Philosophy Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
30 
 
19Thomas C. Anderson, Philosophy and the Experience of God 
according to Gabriel Marcel,” Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 55 (1981): 230. 
20Ibid., p. 236. 
21Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford UK: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), all references to Augustine are from 
this translation. 
22Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, “Deliverance from Error,” in The 
Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali, trans. W. Montgomery Watt 
(Oxford UK: Oneworld Publications, 1998), hereafter DE. 
23Garry Wills, Saint Augustine’s Memory (New York NY: Penguin, 
2002), p. 23. See also, John A. Mourant, Saint Augustine on 
Memory (Villanova PA: Villanova Univ. Press, 1980). 
24Reynold Nicholson, The Idea of Personality in Sufism (Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964), p. 14. 
25See William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious 
Experience (Ithaca NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991). 
26Ibid., p. 2, emphasis mine. 
27Anderson, “Philosophy and the Experience of God,” p. 229. 
28Ibid., p. 237. 
29Ibid., p. 233. 
30Ibid., pp. 233–34. 
31Ibid., p. 234. 
32Ibid., p. 235. 
33See Brendan Sweetman, “Marcel on God and Religious Experience, 
and the Critique of Alston and Hick,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2006): 407–20, see esp. p. 417. 
Here Sweetman also defends Marcel’s approach over the 
analytic strategies of Alston and John Hick, though Sweetman is 
not concerned specifically with mystical experiences. 
34For a good survey of this debate see Gary E. Kessler and Norman 
Prigge, “Is Mystical Experience Everywhere the Same?” in 
Sophia 21 (1982): 39–55. 
35Steven T. Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” in 
Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (New York NY: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 22–74. 
36Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 21. 
37Furlong, Visions and Longings, p. 1. 
